Qualitative decomposition of key inflection points. Contribution estimates based on order-of-magnitude reasoning; precise decomposition would require fund-level portfolio data.
CMN Resolution 4.401/2015 phased in the Liquidity Coverage Ratio in annual steps, reaching 100% in January 2019. Banks must hold High Quality Liquid Assets equal to 100% of projected 30-day stressed outflows — and HQLA in Brazil is almost entirely federal securities (LFTs, LTNs, NTN-Bs).
Bolsonaro's pension reform (approved October 2019) materially reduced long-term fiscal risk. Banks had been light on government bonds following the Dilma crisis of 2014-2016.
Private sector credit growth remained sluggish starting in 2019 as corporates found more attractive funding opportunities in the debentures market due to retail tax incentives.
| Metric | 2005 | 2010 | 2015 | 2020 | 2025* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Credit / GDP | 28.0% | 45.1% | 53.7% | 61.8% | 57.5% |
| Bank Assets / GDP | 74.2% | 98.5% | 118.4% | 131.7% | 128.0% |
| Corporate Loans (PJ) / GDP | 14.5% | 23.0% | 25.7% | 29.6% | 21.0% |
| Individual Loans (PF) / GDP | 13.5% | 22.1% | 28.0% | 32.2% | 36.5% |
| Earmarked / Total Credit | 31.1% | 36.4% | 49.2% | 51.0% | 39.5% |
Source: BCB Relatório de Economia Bancária & Notas de Crédito (December of each year). *2025 preliminary. Universe definition means these numbers may disagree slightly with numbers elsewhere.
The easing cycle (2.0% in 2020) collapsed returns on DI/renda fixa funds, which predominantly hold LFTs. The entire fixed income fund industry had been built around double digit Selic.
2019 was a record year for the Ibovespa and a boom year for Fundos de Investimento Imobiliário (FIIs). Capital that previously sat in DI funds recycled into equity funds, FIIs, and multi-market funds chasing higher returns.
Within fixed income mandates that remained, managers shifted from government bonds to higher-yielding tax-exempt instruments: CRIs (real estate receivables), CRAs (agribusiness receivables), and debentures incentivadas. These offer better after-tax yields than LTNs/NTN-Bs for the same duration risk, and the market grew rapidly from 2017 onward.
As Selic fell, paying 0.5–1.0% annual management fees on a DI fund earning 4–6% became hard to justify. Retail investors shifted to buying LFTs and NTN-Bs directly via Tesouro Direto (TD), bypassing funds entirely. Registered TD investors grew from ~1.5M to 3M+ between 2018 and 2020.
Pension funds must earn INPC/IPCA + ~5–6%/year to meet actuarial benchmarks. With NTN-B real yields well above those targets, there was no reason to take credit or equity risk.
Many large funds posted massive deficits as equity portfolios collapsed. PREVIC required deficit funds to file formal recovery plans (planos de equacionamento) mandating minimum government bond allocation floors. This converted a voluntary gradual reallocation into a mandatory accelerated one.
The complementary pension fund for federal civil servants (created 2013) reached meaningful AUM scale by 2015–2016. By design it invests predominantly in federal securities, adding a steady policy-driven bid for DPF that did not exist before 2013.
| Feature | EFPC Legacy Closed |
EAPC Open / Retail |
Funpresp New DC Closed |
|---|---|---|---|
| AUM Share | ~11% of GDP Shrinking |
~12% of GDP Stagnant |
~2% of GDP Surging |
| Target Audience | Employees of old SOEs (Previ, Petros) or big private corps. | General public (retail banking customers) | New federal civil servants |
| Regulator | PREVIC | SUSEP | PREVIC |
| 2026 Trend | Decumulating: payouts to "old guard" retirees exceed new inflows. | Opportunistic: banks fighting for portability; high Selic hitting inflows. | Explosive accumulation: mandatory for all new hires; 1-for-1 gov match. |
The BRL collapsed from ~R$2.20/USD in 2013 to ~R$4.00 by early 2016.
S&P downgraded Brazil to junk in September 2015; Moody's followed in February 2016. Many institutional mandates have hard floors prohibiting sub-investment-grade holdings, triggering forced selling.
Feb 2026 vs. anchor date. ~19yr uses Jan 2007 (earliest available).
| Holder | Now (R$ bn) | 1yr | 5yr | 10yr | ~19yr |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Banks | 2,703 | 26.2% | 12.6% | 15.6% | 10.2% |
| Funds | 1,837 | 14.9% | 8.1% | 12.7% | 9.1% |
| Pensions | 1,922 | 11.2% | 11.4% | 12.2% | 13.1% |
| Foreigners | 915 | 32.0% | 14.4% | 6.8% | 23.2% |
| Other | 1,134 | 11.6% | 12.8% | 10.8% | 10.8% |
| Total DPFi | 8,511 | 18.6% | 11.4% | 12.3% | 11.3% |
| Avg cost of debt (period avg, Dec of each yr) | 11.9% | 10.7% | 10.3% | 11.3% | 11.3% |
Source: Tesouro Nacional — Relatório Mensal da Dívida Pública Federal, Fevereiro 2026.
Portfolio structure reflects the interplay between liability profiles, regulatory requirements, liquidity needs, and return mandates. The two charts above are a snapshot; the explanations below describe the structural logic that generates them.
LFTs (Tesouro Selic) reset daily to the Selic overnight rate. Their price never deviates from par, meaning they carry zero interest-rate duration risk. For banks funding short-term deposit liabilities, this is the perfect HQLA asset: they satisfy the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and introduce no mismatch between asset sensitivity and liability sensitivity.
Banks raise funds through CDBs, LCIs, LCAs and demand deposits — all floating-rate or short-term.
Banks that issue IPCA+ CDBs or IPCA-linked LCIs hold NTN-Bs as a natural liability hedge.
Brazil's dominant retail fixed-income product is the Fundo DI — a money-market-style fund that tracks the CDI overnight rate with T+0 or T+1 liquidity. To honor same-day redemptions, portfolio managers must hold near-zero-duration assets.
A fund holding significant duration would show negative daily returns when rates rise — unacceptable for clients who expect the DI fund to behave like a savings account. Any credit or duration risk is routed to multimarket funds, not DI funds.
When Selic fell post-2019, DI funds lost assets to tax-exempt credit instruments (CRI, CRA) offering better after-tax yields. The remaining DI fund AUM is the most conservative slice — heavy in LFTs. Higher-yielding mandates rotated out entirely.
Multimercado (multi-asset) funds run leveraged positions on B3 futures. B3's clearinghouse accepts LFTs as margin collateral at full face value with no haircut, because their price never deviates from par. Holding LFTs as collateral is more capital-efficient than cash: the fund earns the full Selic on the collateral while simultaneously using it to support its futures book.
Brazilian pension funds (EFPCs) must earn INPC/IPCA + 5–6% per year to meet their actuarial benchmark. NTN-Bs (Tesouro IPCA+) deliver exactly this: a real yield above IPCA, locked in at purchase. Long-dated NTN-Bs (2035, 2045, 2055, 2060) allow duration matching against liabilities that extend 20–40 years into the future.
CMN Resolution 4,994/2022 (replacing 3,792) requires defined-benefit plans to maintain actuarially sound portfolios. Funds with deficits must file recovery plans mandating higher government bond allocations. Many large funds (Previ, Petros, Funcef) were compelled to increase NTN-B weights after equity losses in 2015–2016.
Pension funds pay monthly benefits to retirees. LFTs are held as a liquid reserve to fund near-term outflows without selling long NTN-Bs at a loss. The target is to hold 2–3 years of projected benefits in short, liquid instruments.
Foreign investors primarily enter Brazil to exploit interest rate differentials and anticipate easing cycles. Prefixed bonds (LTNs and NTN-Fs) offer the largest mark-to-market gain from Selic cuts.
Duration and currency risk already hard enough to predict for foreign investors, no need to overcomplicate. IPCA-linked bonds are also less liquid in secondary markets for foreign participants.
Some global EM mandates also cap duration, pushing foreign allocations toward 2–5yr LTNs rather than 30yr NTN-Bs.
LFTs technically carry multi-year legal maturities (e.g. LFT 2029, LFT 2031) but behave as overnight instruments — they reset daily to Selic and never deviate from par. This means the maturity distribution for banks overstates their true duration risk: the bulk of the 1–5yr bucket is LFTs with no effective duration.
Banks actively trade DPF across all maturities in their trading books and hold them as repo collateral with the BCB (overnight facility). The 3–5yr and 5yr+ segments reflect LTNs and NTN-Bs held as repo collateral or fair-value hedges for structured products.
68% of fund holdings mature in less than 3 years. CVM rules also require daily mark-to-market.
Long NTN-Bs (2045, 2055, 2060) are held almost exclusively by pensions and insurance companies. Funds that do hold long duration are typically classified as "FI Renda Fixa Longo Prazo" with lock-up periods — they serve a different client profile and represent a small portion of total fund DPF exposure.
A pension fund paying benefits to a 50-year-old participant has a liability stream extending 30+ years. Long NTN-Bs (2055, 2060) lock in a real yield for decades.
Sophisticated EFPCs use duration immunization (matching asset and liability Macaulay durations) and cash flow matching (buying bonds whose coupons/principal coincide with projected benefit payments). This is only possible with a range of maturities — hence the spread across 1–3yr (LFTs for near-term benefits), 3–5yr (medium NTN-Bs), and 5yr+ (ultra-long NTN-Bs for retirement horizon liabilities).
With double digit yields some investors woudld rather not worry about additional duration risk.
The short end of the Brazilian yield curve (LTN maturities up to 2yr) is the most liquid DPF segment, with the tightest bid-ask spreads and deepest secondary market. They can sometimes be more cost efficient than NDFs. Long NTN-Bs (2050+) trade in much smaller size and with wider spreads.
Many EM hedge fund pods run a "Cupom Cambial" strategy: buy short LTNs, roll at maturity, capture the positive carry vs. USD funding costs while hedging FX via NDF or onshore FX swaps.
| Instrument | Dez/25 | Jan/26 | Fev/26 | Share | MoM Δ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DPF (Total) | 8,635.1 | 8,641.1 | 8,840.7 | 100% | +199.6 |
| Taxa Flutuante (LFT) | 4,166.7 | 4,270.4 | 4,340.9 | 49% | +70.5 |
| Índice de Preços (NTN-B) | 2,239.5 | 2,277.0 | 2,285.5 | 26% | +8.6 |
| Prefixados (LTN / NTN-F) | 1,904.0 | 1,784.3 | 1,885.9 | 21% | +101.6 |
| Câmbio (DPFe) | 324.9 | 309.5 | 328.4 | 4% | +18.9 |
| DPMFi (Local) | 8,309.0 | 8,330.5 | 8,511.3 | 96% | +180.8 |
The primary balance (revenues minus non-interest spending) has been negative for most of the past decade. Forecasting the deficit was perenially hard (see FOCUS consensus) due to macro volatility, mid-year politically driven spending announcements, and other factors, but despite its flaws the 2023 fiscal framework has reduced forecast error.
With Selic at ~14.75% and total DPF near R$8.8 trillion, monthly interest accrual runs ~R$108bn. Because 49% of the stock is LFT (Selic-linked), rate cuts directly reduce this snowball effect, while rate hikes accelerate it. The Feb/26 MoM debt increase of R$199.6bn splits roughly 50/50 between accrued interest and net new issuance.
The redemption calendar concentrates around specific instrument maturities. Despite these lumpy maturities, 2025 gross issuance was remarkably stable: H1 averaged R$163bn/month versus R$140bn in H2 — only a ~16% gap. The Treasury smooths issuance through pre-financing and its cash reserve buffer, absorbing maturity spikes without forcing large auction concessions.
Each line shows how market consensus for a given calendar year's primary balance (% GDP) evolved over time. Negative = deficit. Source: BCB FOCUS survey, weekly median.
The Plano Anual de Financiamento (PAF) is published by the Treasury each January, setting indicative composition and maturity targets for the year. Targets are not legally binding — they are guides for issuance strategy, with stated intentions to:
H1/26 = R$764.1bn (Mar spike driven by LFT rollover); H2/26 = R$807.8bn (Aug spike driven by NTN-B). Source: DPMFi Feb/26 report.
| Instrument | Heaviest Maturity Months | Common Maturities Issued | Treasury Rollover Strategy |
|---|---|---|---|
| LFT Floating / Selic |
Mar 2027 (~R$490bn) Sep 2027 |
Mar 2032 (primary benchmark) | Aggressively rolling legacy 3-yr debt into a single 6-yr benchmark to reduce single-month cliff risk |
| LTN Zero-coupon fixed |
Jul 2026 (R$251.7bn) Apr 2027 |
Apr 2027 (12m) Jan 2032 (72m) |
Establishing 6 tenors (6m–72m) to distribute redemptions and avoid single-month spikes |
| NTN-F Fixed 10% semi-annual coupon |
Jan 2027 (~R$310bn+ principal + coupons) | Jan 2031 (5-yr) Jan 2037 (10-yr) |
Shifting the "January wall" from 2027 into 2031/2037 benchmarks to extend duration |
| NTN-B IPCA + real yield |
Aug 2026 (R$288.4bn) May 2027 |
May 2031 Aug 2040 (standard tenors) |
Offering IPCA + 6% to prevent EFPCs (pension funds) from selling into the secondary market |
Source: DPMFi Feb/26 report. H1 avg R$163bn/month, H2 avg R$140bn/month — Jan/25 through Dec/25.
Source: STN/Tesouro Nacional RMD Fev/26 (Anexo 1.6). Dívida Mobiliária (global bonds) only; R$ billions. 2015 and 2022 = zero issuance. Note: BRL depreciation inflates later years in BRL terms.
The Treasury maintains a cash buffer equivalent to 6–9 months of upcoming maturities, held in the Conta Única at the BCB. This reserve is used opportunistically — the Treasury can step back from primary auctions when market conditions are unfavorable (high risk premia, stressed liquidity) and draw down the buffer instead. In practice this means issuance over-shoots financing needs in benign conditions and under-shoots during stress. The buffer also provides fiscal credibility: it insulates near-term debt servicing from short-term market disruptions.
Dealers must absorb large gross supply even when it is merely replacing maturing paper. Balance sheet capacity is finite, so heavy auction calendars widen concessions regardless of what the net figure shows.
Treasury rarely rolls a maturity into the same instrument. A maturing NTN-B is typically replaced with a longer-dated one — so even net-zero issuance can represent significant duration extension being pushed onto the market.
Large maturity clusters concentrate reinvestment risk. If sentiment sours when a R$300bn+ maturity wall hits, the rollover can price very badly — or partially fail — even if the annual net number looks benign.
Global macro funds size Brazil risk against the gross auction calendar. A country rolling R$300bn+ in NTN-Bs in a single year reads as vulnerable to a confidence shock — net issuance notwithstanding. The 2024 episode is the clearest recent example.
| Investor Type | 12M Avg (R$bn) | 36M Avg (R$bn) |
|---|---|---|
| Banks (Inst. Financeiras) | +46.8 | +31.7 |
| Funds (Fundos) | +19.9 | +12.4 |
| Pensions (Previdência) | +16.2 | +17.8 |
| Foreigners (Não-res.) | +18.5 | +10.2 |
| Other | +9.8 | +8.3 |
| Bond Type | 12M Avg (R$bn) | 36M Avg (R$bn) |
|---|---|---|
| LFT (Floating) | +17.8 | +21.3 |
| LTN (Short Fixed) | +1.4 | -3.0 |
| NTN-B (IPCA-linked) | +0.5 | -3.8 |
| NTN-F (Long Fixed) | +11.4 | +3.1 |
| Demais | -2.7 | -3.3 |
Note — Supply and Demand will not reconcile. The demand series (Anexo 2.7) measures the month-over-month change in outstanding stock, which includes IPCA principal correction on NTN-Bs accruing every month without any cash transaction. The supply series (Anexo 1.3) measures only cash transactions — gross sales minus maturities — and excludes bond exchanges (Trocas), where Treasury swaps old bonds for new ones with no net money raised. Expect demand to run structurally above supply.
Observable, near-real-time indicators that proxy for each investor class's demand before the monthly RMD is published (~3–4 week lag).
Structural LCR demand meets cyclical credit dynamics.
BCB requires banks to hold HQLA equal to 100% of projected 30-day stressed outflows. Brazilian HQLA is almost exclusively federal securities (LFTs, LTNs, NTN-Bs). Monthly LCR disclosures signal whether banks are at the floor and forced to buy, or holding excess buffer.
When loan growth lags deposit funding growth, the surplus lands in government bonds. Monitor the spread between total deposits and total credit outstanding; a widening gap is a leading indicator of bank DPF demand.
Banks that grow their liability book faster than their loan book must deploy the excess. Net issuance of CDBs and tax-exempt LCIs/LCAs above credit origination growth tends to flow into LFTs.
Rate hikes increase LFT daily carry, making them more attractive vs. credit risk on a risk-adjusted basis. Rate cuts do the opposite and can shift banks toward longer-duration NTN-Fs for yield pickup.
Fund flows are the most timely proxy — ANBIMA publishes weekly.
Net subscriptions/redemptions by fund category (DI, renda fixa, multimercado) are the most direct proxy. DI fund inflows translate almost mechanically into LFT demand; renda fixa inflows into LTN/NTN-B demand.
Tax-exempt credit instruments compete directly with government bonds for fixed income fund allocations. Heavy CRI/CRA issuance months reliably correlate with government bond underperformance in fund portfolios.
Retail Tesouro Direto net purchases signal broad fixed income sentiment. TD growth reduces the intermediary role of fixed income funds, structurally compressing DI fund AUM over time.
When multimercado funds are running high gross leverage in DI futures, they also tend to hold more government bond collateral. Futures positioning data (B3) gives a weekly read. Returns-based analysis of “O Kit Brasil” can proxy positioning.
Demand is largely automatic once real yields exceed actuarial targets.
Funded ratio below 100% forces pension funds to extend duration and increase NTN-B allocations to close the gap between assets and actuarial liability. Published quarterly but widely tracked in real time by plan sponsors.
The actuarial benchmark for most Brazilian defined-benefit plans is INPC/IPCA + 5.5–6.0%/year. When NTN-B real yields trade above this level, buying is nearly automatic. When below, demand stalls.
Pension funds with negative net cash flow (outflows > contributions) are forced sellers of LFTs to fund monthly benefits. Periods of demographic stress compress LFT holdings and increase NTN-B duration bias.
The federal civil servant pension fund grows at a fixed rate tied to enrollment and contribution rules. Its DPF demand is policy-driven and largely insensitive to market signals — a baseline bid that can be modeled from payroll data.
High-frequency BCB and B3 data lead the RMD by 3–4 weeks.
BCB publishes weekly portfolio investment flows in fixed income ~10 days after the reference week — roughly 3 weeks ahead of the RMD. The closest real-time proxy available.
B3 publishes daily foreign holdings of DPMFi bonds in custody. Provides near-daily resolution on foreign demand direction even before BCB or RMD data.
At times, foreign hedge funds can buy LTNs and hedge out FX via the cupom cambial market, capturing a pickup over USD-equivalent debt that is quite attractive on a hedged basis.
Market prices that influence or predict each investor class's allocation decisions.
SELIC level and curve shape determine LFT vs. LTN duration preference.
LFTs reprice daily at SELIC. A high absolute SELIC rate makes LFTs attractive vs. private credit — banks earn near-sovereign returns with zero duration risk. The higher the SELIC, the more LFT-heavy bank portfolios tend to be.
When the front end of the DI curve is inverted or flat, banks favor LFTs over LTNs for LCR purposes (LFTs carry no mark-to-market volatility). A steep curve can encourage extension into LTNs for yield pickup.
When bank funding costs (CDB rates) rise above DI, NIM compression incentivizes more sovereign bond holding as a low-risk, liquid asset. Narrow CDB spreads allow banks to be more selective.
Clear rate guidance anchors duration decisions. A hiking cycle → LFT overweight; a credible easing cycle → incremental shift to LTN/NTN-F.
Real rate level drives inflows; curve shape and credit spreads drive duration.
High real rates attract inflows to fixed income funds broadly. When the DI-implied real rate exceeds ~7–8%, retail allocation to fixed income funds surges and government bond demand follows.
The slope between 1Y and 5Y LTN yields determines whether funds extend duration. A steep curve (>150bps) encourages extension into NTN-Fs; a flat or inverted curve pushes funds to LFTs or shorter LTNs.
The key substitution signal for fixed income fund managers. When tax-exempt credit spreads compress toward government bond yields (net of tax advantage), funds rotate back into government bonds. Currently tracking ~80–120bps net spread.
When equities are cheap relative to bonds (earnings yield well above NTN-B real yield), multimercado funds rotate from fixed income to equities, reducing DPF demand. The equity/bond frontier matters for multi-asset allocations.
Long-end NTN-B real yields are the primary trigger for duration extension.
The single most important price signal for pension demand. Long-end NTN-B real yields above IPCA + 6.5% have historically triggered aggressive buying by defined-benefit plans. Currently ~7.0–7.5% on the long end — elevated by historical standards.
When long-end NTN-Bs yield 50–100bps more than 5Y NTN-Bs, pension funds extend duration to match long-dated liabilities. When the curve is flat or inverted, they park in shorter NTN-Bs and LFTs.
Higher inflation expectations erode the attractiveness of nominal bonds (LTN/NTN-F) for pensions with IPCA-linked liabilities. Elevated FOCUS inflation = tilt toward NTN-B over NTN-F.
CNPC Resolution 30 sets maximum discount rates for actuarial liability valuation at INPC + 4.16%–6.05% depending on plan vintage. When market NTN-B yields approach or breach the cap, pensions are technically in surplus — reducing urgency to buy.
Currency trend and carry-to-vol are the two dominant signals for foreign investors.
ANBIMA MaRC daily pricing (2026-03-26) · Tesouro Nacional RMD Anexo 2.2 · Notional as of Fev/26 · Duration computed from coupon schedule: LTN (zero-coupon), NTN-F (10% p.a. semi-annual), NTN-B (6% p.a. semi-annual), LFT (floating-rate, duration ≈ 0) · LFT yields = Selic (14.75%) + spread; LTN/NTN-F are nominal; NTN-B are real (IPCA+)
| Bond Type | ISIN | Maturity Date | Notional (R$bn) | Yield (%) | Duration (yrs) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| LFT | BRSTNCLF1RE0 | 2026-03-01 | 341.39 | — | — |
| LTN | BRSTNCLTN8B5 | 2026-04-01 | 127.95 | 14.7172 | 0.01 |
| LTN | BRSTNCLTN848 | 2026-07-01 | 208.09 | 14.1887 | 0.23 |
| NTN-B | BRSTNCNTB4U6 | 2026-08-15 | 235.62 | 8.7396 | 0.37 |
| LFT | BRSTNCLF1RF7 | 2026-09-01 | 166.76 | -0.0510 | 0.00 |
| LTN | BRSTNCLTN8G4 | 2026-10-01 | 65.43 | 14.0807 | 0.45 |
| LTN | BRSTNCLTN8C3 | 2027-01-01 | 5.72 | — | — |
| NTN-F | BRSTNCNTF1P8 | 2027-01-01 | 111.62 | 14.1725 | 0.70 |
| LFT | BRSTNCLF1RG5 | 2027-03-01 | 539.16 | 0.0006 | 0.00 |
| LTN | BRSTNCLTN8I0 | 2027-04-01 | 91.84 | 14.1443 | 0.89 |
| NTN-B | BRSTNCNTB682 | 2027-05-15 | 126.22 | 8.1808 | 1.05 |
| LTN | BRSTNCLTN871 | 2027-07-01 | 99.51 | 14.1277 | 1.11 |
| LFT | BRSTNCLF1RH3 | 2027-09-01 | 463.18 | 0.0085 | 0.00 |
| LTN | BRSTNCLTN8L4 | 2027-10-01 | 101.56 | 14.1623 | 1.33 |
| LTN | BRSTNCLTN897 | 2028-01-01 | 61.10 | 14.0946 | 1.55 |
| LFT | BRSTNCLF1RI1 | 2028-03-01 | 321.92 | 0.0143 | 0.00 |
| LTN | BRSTNCLTN8M2 | 2028-04-01 | 9.27 | 14.0652 | 1.77 |
| LTN | BRSTNCLTN8F6 | 2028-07-01 | 21.83 | 14.0751 | 1.99 |
| NTN-B | BRSTNCNTB4X0 | 2028-08-15 | 230.31 | 8.1141 | 2.16 |
| LFT | BRSTNCLF1RK7 | 2028-09-01 | 323.21 | 0.0250 | 0.00 |
| LTN | BRSTNCLTN806 | 2029-01-01 | 173.38 | 14.1260 | 2.43 |
| NTN-F | BRSTNCNTF1Q6 | 2029-01-01 | 121.20 | 14.1316 | 2.25 |
| LFT | BRSTNCLF1RL5 | 2029-03-01 | 345.08 | 0.0402 | 0.00 |
| NTN-B | BRSTNCNTB716 | 2029-05-15 | 59.19 | 8.0061 | 2.73 |
| LTN | BRSTNCLTN8K6 | 2029-07-01 | 127.84 | 14.1809 | 2.86 |
| LFT | BRSTNCLF1RM3 | 2029-09-01 | 311.80 | 0.0524 | 0.00 |
| LTN | BRSTNCLTN8A7 | 2030-01-01 | 86.71 | 14.2030 | 3.30 |
| LFT | BRSTNCLF1RO9 | 2030-03-01 | 256.95 | 0.0650 | 0.00 |
| LFT | BRSTNCLF1RQ4 | 2030-06-01 | 190.79 | 0.0680 | 0.00 |
| NTN-B | BRSTNCNTB3B8 | 2030-08-15 | 222.18 | 8.0302 | 3.73 |
| LFT | BRSTNCLF1RR2 | 2030-09-01 | 209.24 | 0.0773 | 0.00 |
| LFT | BRSTNCLF1RT8 | 2030-12-01 | 138.80 | 0.0794 | 0.00 |
| LTN | BRSTNCLTN8D1 | 2031-01-01 | 2.84 | — | — |
| NTN-F | BRSTNCNTF204 | 2031-01-01 | 188.01 | 14.3318 | 3.48 |
| LFT | BRSTNCLF1RU6 | 2031-03-01 | 190.80 | 0.0909 | 0.00 |
| NTN-B | BRSTNCNTB7X3 | 2031-05-15 | 7.07 | 7.9835 | 4.19 |
| LFT | BRSTNCLF1RW2 | 2031-06-01 | 181.97 | 0.0948 | 0.00 |
| LFT | BRSTNCLF1RX0 | 2031-09-01 | 154.49 | 0.0968 | 0.00 |
| LFT | BRSTNCLF1RZ5 | 2031-12-01 | 127.72 | 0.0993 | 0.00 |
| LTN | BRSTNCLTN8J8 | 2032-01-01 | 84.89 | 14.3080 | 5.05 |
| LFT | BRSTNCLF1S08 | 2032-03-01 | 74.57 | 0.1066 | 0.00 |
| NTN-B | BRSTNCNTB674 | 2032-08-15 | 111.52 | 7.9233 | 5.10 |
| NTN-F | BRSTNCNTF212 | 2033-01-01 | 70.73 | 14.3115 | 4.43 |
| NTN-B | BRSTNCNTB6B1 | 2033-05-15 | 63.16 | 7.9040 | 5.48 |
| NTN-F | BRSTNCNTF238 | 2035-01-01 | 101.29 | 14.2827 | 5.14 |
| NTN-B | BRSTNCNTB0O7 | 2035-05-15 | 249.83 | 7.6976 | 6.61 |
| NTN-F | BRSTNCNTF2K7 | 2037-01-01 | 20.24 | 14.2942 | 5.66 |
| NTN-B | BRSTNCNTB7Y1 | 2037-05-15 | 7.56 | 7.5936 | 7.59 |
| NTN-B | BRSTNCNTB3C6 | 2040-08-15 | 137.45 | 7.4454 | 9.07 |
| NTN-B | BRSTNCNTB0A6 | 2045-05-15 | 171.26 | 7.3593 | 10.37 |
| NTN-B | BRSTNCNTB3D4 | 2050-08-15 | 231.34 | 7.3141 | 11.66 |
| NTN-B | BRSTNCNTB4Q4 | 2055-05-15 | 157.18 | 7.3081 | 12.11 |
| NTN-B | BRSTNCNTB690 | 2060-08-15 | 96.14 | 7.3082 | 12.80 |